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983 
ANYTHING BUT COMMON:  
NEW YORK’S “PENDING OR ANTICIPATED 
LITIGATION” LIMITATION TO THE COMMON 
INTEREST DOCTRINE CREATES MORE  




Abstract: New York’s highest court recently handed down Ambac v. Countrywide, a 
decision that has major ramifications in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) world.  Once 
parties sign a merger or acquisition agreement, they share a common interest in ensuring that 
both parties comply with applicable laws, a process that requires legal communications with 
each other’s attorneys. Under the common interest doctrine, Delaware and the majority of 
federal circuits apply the attorney-client privilege to shield many of these communications 
from discovery.  However, Ambac upset M&A attorneys’ reliance on the common interest 
doctrine by holding that parties to a merger waive their attorney-client privilege when they 
share legal advice with the other entity’s attorneys, unless the communications relate to 
pending or anticipated litigation. In addition to the M&A world, Ambac will have negative 
consequences for many business entities attempting to comply with the law on advice from 
counsel during major transactions. While a number of commentators have addressed the 
litigation requirement tangentially, there is currently no thorough evaluation of the state of 
this requirement, which has special relevance in the post-Ambac world. This Comment 
evaluates the history and purpose of the common interest doctrine and surveys the current 
state of the law across multiple jurisdictions. This Comment then argues that Ambac’s 
litigation requirement is contrary to the purpose of the attorney-client privilege—to 
encourage persons and entities to freely seek legal advice in order to comply with the law. 
Finally, this Comment urges the many jurisdictions with underdeveloped law on the common 
interest doctrine to reject Ambac’s restrictive litigation requirement. 
INTRODUCTION 
The attorney-client privilege plays an important role in our legal 
system to encourage “full and frank communication between attorneys 
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.”1 The Supreme Court of 
the United States has placed great emphasis on clarity when defining the 
scope of the privilege. As the Court noted, an uncertain privilege is “no 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Andrew Escobar 
for providing the idea for this Comment, and for his helpful feedback. Thank you also to Professor 
Maureen Howard for her critical direction and feedback. Finally, thank you to the Washington Law 
Review editing team, without which this piece would not be possible. 
1. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). 
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privilege at all”2 because if there is doubt as to whether a legal 
communication is discoverable, clients are much less likely to make that 
communication to their attorney
3—thereby contravening the privilege’s 
purpose. 
Clients may waive the attorney-client privilege if they disclose their 
communications to third parties.
4
 The common interest doctrine is 
perhaps the most confusing aspect of third-party waiver. The common 
interest doctrine allows a client to avoid waiving the attorney-client 
privilege by disclosing an otherwise privileged communication to a third 
party, when the client and the third party share a common legal interest.
5
 
The common interest doctrine began as a “joint defense” doctrine in 
criminal cases,
6
 and later expanded to civil cases as well.
7
 While many 
jurisdictions have adopted the common interest doctrine, the details of 
the doctrine differ based on jurisdiction, and many jurisdictions have not 
adopted a common interest doctrine in the civil arena at all.
8
 
One particularly muddled aspect of the common interest doctrine 
recently thrust itself front and center in the mergers and acquisitions 
world: the litigation requirement, which allows the common interest 
doctrine to protect communications only when those communications 
relate to litigation.
9
 States and the federal circuits differ widely on 




New York’s highest court recently gave a lengthy defense of the 
litigation requirement in Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc.
11
 The Ambac majority and dissenting opinions disagreed 
                                                     
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).   
3. Id. at 392–93.  
4. See, e.g., Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
party waived attorney-client privilege by voluntarily disclosing communications to a social worker). 
5. See Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 213 P.3d 596, 601 (2009) (“The 
presence of a third person during the communication waives the privilege, unless the third 
person . . . has retained the attorney on a matter of ‘common interest.’”) (citations omitted).  
6. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822, 841–42 (1871) (reasoning that the exception was 
justified because the parties “had the same defen[s]e to make”); see also Ambac Assur. Corp. v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 36 (N.Y. 2016) (describing the “joint defense” 
doctrine’s origins in Chahoon).  
7. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942) (expanding the common interest 
doctrine to civil cases) (overruled on other grounds); UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1999). 
8. See infra Part III.  
9. See Ambac, 57 N.E.3d 30 (adopting the litigation requirement). 
10. See infra Part III. 
11. 57 N.E.3d at 38.  
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sharply about whether a litigation requirement is doctrinally sound, 
supported by historical precedent, and supported by policy 
considerations.
12
 This Comment argues that jurisdictions should reject 
Ambac’s formulation of the litigation requirement for three reasons. 
First, Ambac’s assertion that courts need not ensure that the common 
interest doctrine advances the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is doctrinally unsound.
13
 Second, the litigation 
requirement is not necessary to ensure broad discovery because the 
common interest doctrine is limited by the other requirements of the 
attorney-client privilege: it only covers legal communications, not 
business communications or underlying facts.
14
 Third, the litigation 
requirement is contrary to the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-
client privilege, and it will result in poorer legal advice, produce less 
compliance with the law, and encourage gamesmanship.
15
 
This Comment proceeds in five Parts. Part I discusses the attorney-
client privilege and waiver generally as context for a discussion of the 
common interest doctrine. Part II traces the history and current state of 
the common interest doctrine. Part III focuses narrowly on the litigation 
requirement and surveys the current state of the requirement (or lack 
thereof) in state and federal jurisdictions. Part IV discusses the Ambac 
case, which adopts a litigation requirement and frames the common 
interest doctrine as an “exception” to third-party waiver of the attorney-
client privilege. Finally, Part V argues that jurisdictions should reject 
Ambac’s litigation requirement as an arbitrary and doctrinally unsound 
limitation on the common interest doctrine—and therefore on the 
attorney-client privilege itself. Part V therefore urges jurisdictions to 
reject Ambac’s rationale for a litigation requirement.  
I. THIRD-PARTY WAIVER LIMITS THE SCOPE OF 
COMMUNICATIONS THAT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE PROTECTS 
The common interest doctrine prevents third-party waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege.
16
 Thus, it is important to first understand the 
                                                     
12. See generally id.  
13. See infra section V.A. 
14. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
15. See infra section V.C.  
16. See, e.g., Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 35 (“[W]here two or more clients separately retain counsel to 
advise them on matters of common legal interest, the common interest exception allows them to 
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attorney-client privilege and waiver generally. Scores of scholars have 
addressed the attorney-client privilege and waiver.
17
 This Part attempts 
to provide information sufficient to allow the reader to evaluate the 
common interest doctrine in its proper context. In particular, this Part 
provides background on the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege and the third-party waiver doctrine. 
A. All Jurisdictions Protect Legal Communications Between Attorneys 
and Their Clients 
The attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications known to the common law.”18 The 
privilege applies to corporations as well as individuals
19
 and applies 
equally to communications that relate to litigation and those that do 
not.
20
 There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the attorney-client 
privilege; instead, a web of statutes and common law governs.
21
 




The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the 
light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege 
unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
the United States Constitution; 
a federal statute; or 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
                                                     
shield from disclosure certain attorney-client communications that are revealed to one another for 
the purpose of furthering a common legal interest.”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
17. See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. 1961); PAUL R. RICE ET AL., 2 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. (2d ed. 
1999); KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. student ed. 2006).  
18. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
19. Id. 
20. See, e.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding 
that attorney-client privilege covered submission of invention record to corporate legal counsel for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice); Adler v. Greenfield, 990 N.E.2d 1219, 1237 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2016) (holding that attorney-client privilege covered legal, estate-planning oriented communications 
between attorney and client’s representative).   
21. On the federal level, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs privileges and gives federal courts 
leeway to interpret privileges in light of the common law. Some states extensively codify their 
attorney-client privilege and its exceptions—examples are Delaware (DEL. R. EVID. 502), Idaho 
(IDAHO R. EVID. 502), and North Dakota (N.D. R. EVID. 502). Other states rely almost exclusively 
on the common law to define privileges—examples are West Virginia (W. VA. R. EVID. 501) and 
Wyoming (WYO. R. EVID. 501).  
22. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim 
or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.
23
 
The Judiciary Committee rejected a proposed FRE 501 that enumerated 
nine specific privileges and instead determined that it was best to leave 
specific privileges to the common law.
24
 Judiciary Committee Notes to 
FRE 501 indicates that Congress left full discretion to judges to define 
and apply privileges “in the light of reason and experience.”25 The 
attorney-client privilege on the federal level—as well as the other 
privileges—is now a matter of federal common law. Therefore, federal 
judges have wide latitude to interpret the privilege in light of its 
purposes. 
Courts widely apply the standard formulation of the privilege that was 
created by Professor John Henry Wigmore: 
1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, 3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, 4) made in confidence 
5) by the client, 6) are at his insistence permanently protected 7) 
from the disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 8) except 
the protection be waived.
26
 
The burden is on the party asserting the privilege to prove each of these 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
27
 
State privilege rules apply in state cases and in federal civil cases 
where state law provides the rule of decision.
28
 Most states address the 
attorney-client privilege through state statutes and state rules of 
evidence, while other states apply attorney-client privilege solely as a 
matter of common law.
29
 
                                                     
23. Id. 
24. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 at 8–9 (1973), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/ 
1975_Orig_Enact/House%20Report%2093-650%20(1974).pdf [https://perma.cc/87V2-DBPX]. 
25. Id.  
26. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2292, at 554. See also United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 171 
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Prof. Wigmore’s language); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (same).  
27. See, e.g., Ralls v. United States, 52 F.3d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A party asserting the 
attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing the relationship and the privileged nature of 
the communication.”). 
28. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
29. Compare W. VA. R. EVID. 501 (closely mirroring Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and providing 
that privileges are governed by the common law), with ARK. R. EVID. 502 (statutorily defining 
attorney-client privilege).  
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In all jurisdictions, the attorney-client privilege protects only legal 
communications.
30
 To successfully invoke the privilege for a specific 
communication, the purpose of the communication must have been to 
obtain legal advice from the client’s attorney.31 The underlying facts of a 
communication are not privileged,
32
 nor are communications for the 
purpose of obtaining business advice.
33
 A communication is not 
privileged where it “neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion 
whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of business 
advice.”34 
In defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege, all jurisdictions 
agree that it must be shaped by its purposes. The next section discusses 
the primary, overarching purpose of the privilege: to improve legal 




B. The Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege Is Full Client 
Disclosure 
The primary purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage 
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”36 The United States Supreme Court37 has long 
recognized the importance to the legal system of “encourag[ing] clients 
to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”38 Full disclosure enables 
attorneys to represent their clients adequately.
39
 However, clients who 
                                                     
30. See, e.g., N.H. R. EVID. 502 Reporter’s Notes (“Generally the [attorney-client] privilege does 
not exist when consultation is held with a lawyer as a friend or in some business capacity not 
involving the rendering of legal advice or services.”). 
31. Id. 
32. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
33. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). 
34. Id. 
35. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96. 
36. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). 
37. Some states have codified their attorney-client privilege rules. In those states, the analysis 
may be less governed by common law and more by the code. That said, common law principles still 
play a role and the purposes of attorney-client privilege still apply. For that reason, this Part focuses 
on the federal common law of attorney-client privilege.  
38. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (citing United States v. Nashville R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915)).  
39. Id.  
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fear their communications will be disclosed may withhold important 
facts from their attorneys.
40
 
Encouraging full and frank communication between clients and 
lawyers helps ensure that the clients comply with the law. This benefits 
clients, the legal system, and society as a whole.
41
 Without full 
information from clients, attorneys are more likely to give inaccurate 
advice that leads their clients down a path of noncompliance or poor 
litigation strategy.
42
 The Supreme Court recognizes that the privilege’s 
application must be predictable to serve its purposes.
43
 Both attorneys 
and clients need to know which communications they can expect to 
shield from discovery.
44
 If there is doubt as to whether legal 
communications are discoverable, clients are much less likely to make 
those communications to their attorneys.
45
 
An example of how the full disclosure purpose shapes the privilege is 
the seminal case of Upjohn Co. v. United States, which relied on the 
purpose of full disclosure in rejecting a lower court’s “control group” 
test for the communications of corporate employees.
46
 The control group 
test would have limited the corporate attorney-client privilege to the 
communications of senior management, on the grounds that only senior 
management personify the client corporation when it communicates with 
its counsel.
47
 The Court rejected the control group test on three related 
grounds. First, that middle and lower-level employees often possess the 
information needed by corporate counsel to ensure that the corporate 
                                                     
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 389 (attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and 
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its 
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the 
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 
(1888)).  
42. As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be 
obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, 
the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully 
informed legal advice.  
Katherine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not 
Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 57 (2005) (quoting Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1972)).  
43. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (“[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the 
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular 
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results 
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 392–93.  
46. Id. at 396.  
47. Id. at 390.  
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client complies with the law.
48
 Second, that not extending the attorney-
client privilege to communications by middle and lower-level employees 
would discourage “the communication of relevant information by 
employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the 
client corporation.”49 Third, the control group test prevented legal 
communications from counsel to middle and lower-level employees 
“who will put into effect the client corporation’s policy.”50 The chilling 
effect on communication would inhibit the kind of sound legal advice 
that promotes the “broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”51 
Upjohn is an example of the Supreme Court using a practical 
approach to define the bounds of the attorney-client privilege to ensure 
that full disclosure and sound legal advice were possible between 
corporate clients and their counsel. The Court recognized that it had the 
power to shape the privilege with “the principles of the common law 
as . . . interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.”52 It noted 
that corporations face “a vast and complicated array of regulatory 
legislation”53 that is “hardly an instinctive matter,”54 and rejected a test 
that would limit the corporation’s ability to comply with such 
legislation.
55
 In doing so, Upjohn suggested an approach to attorney-
client privilege that emphasizes function over form. 
C. Third-Party Disclosure Waives the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege applies to communications made in 
confidence.
56
 Disclosure of such a communication to a third-party often 
waives the privilege because it signals an indifference to 
                                                     
48. Id. at 391. 
49. Id. at 392.  
50. Id.   
51. Id. at 389.  
52. Id. at 397 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).  
53. Id. at 392.  
54. Id. (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–41 (1978)). 
55. For a detailed analysis of the attorney-client privilege and the common interest exception as 
applied to major business transactions, see Anne King, Note, The Common Interest Doctrine and 
Disclosures During Negotiations for Substantial Transactions, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411 (2007). 
Note, however, that King assumes a “pending or anticipated litigation” requirement applies to the 
common interest exception. Id. at 1424 (“The common interest doctrine may also apply before 
litigation occurs, as long as the parties anticipate being possible targets of litigation in the area of 
their common interest.”) (citations omitted). This is a requirement not present in several 
jurisdictions and one that this Comment argues against. See infra Parts III, V.   
56. See Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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 It is not a client’s subjective intention that triggers 
waiver, but rather whether the client objectively demonstrates the proper 
respect for confidentiality.
58
 For that reason, careless third-party 
disclosures constitute waiver,
59




With the exception of enumerated waiver provisions in Federal Rule 
of Evidence 502 and in some state statutes, common law dictates which 
persons or entities constitute third parties for purposes of waiver.
61
 
Courts have held that disclosure to an auditor,
62
 to a social worker,
63
 and 
to a wider audience via blog or e-mail
64
 constitute third-party waiver. 
However, two clients represented by the same attorney may disclose 
privileged communications relating to the represented matter to each 
other without waiving the privilege.
65
 Courts recognize that the purposes 
of the attorney-client privilege are best served by those clients being able 
to communicate with each other in this setting, where both clients expect 
that the communications will be privileged as to the outside world, but 
not between each other.
66
 For the same reasons, communications to 
some agents of the client,
67
 to the lawyer’s staff,68 or to an interpreter69 
                                                     
57. Id.  
58. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2327. 
59. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 644 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that the 
attorney-client privilege may be waived by a careless, unintentional, or inadvertent disclosure). 
60. SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
61. See FED. R. EVID. 502 (enumerating some forms of waiver).  
62. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
63. See Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007). 
64. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4286329, at *3–5 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 22, 2010).   
65. James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: 
Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 634 
(1997) (“The ‘joint client’ privilege attaches when the clients are represented by a common lawyer. 
Communications among the clients and their common lawyer remain privileged as against third 
parties, and the joint client privilege applies to both litigated and nonlitigated matters.”).  
66. Id. at 648 (“[C]onfidentiality is preserved because the values associated with the disclosure to 
the third person outweigh the interests in treating the privilege as having been waived.”).  
67. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). 
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“A lawyer may disclose privileged communications to other office lawyers and with 
appropriate nonlawyer staff—secretaries, file clerks, computer operators, investigators, office 
managers, paralegal assistants, telecommunications personnel, and similar law-office assistants.”).  
69. See People v. Osario, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (N.Y. 1989) (“[C]ommunications made to 
counsel through a hired interpreter, or one serving as an agent of either attorney or client to facilitate 
communication, generally will be privileged.”). 
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generally do not constitute waiver because these parties are necessary to 
further legal representation. 
The waiver analysis is inseparable from the attorney-client privilege 
analysis because the extent of waiver defines the scope of the privilege.
70
 
This connected nature between the privilege itself and waiver of the 
privilege is shown by the fact that generally the party claiming attorney-
client privilege must establish lack of waiver as an element of the 
privilege.
71
 In this sense, waiver simply describes a circumstance in 
which the attorney-client privilege does not apply. In either case, the 
privilege does not cover the communications, and a judge will likely 
deny a claim of privilege and order the communications to be disclosed. 
For these reasons, the waiver rules must further the purposes of the 
attorney-client privilege because they are fundamentally aimed at the 
same goal: balancing liberal discovery rules against the societal benefit 
from clients’ full disclosure that facilitates sound legal advice and 
compliance with the law. 
One area of waiver that has caused considerable confusion is the 
common interest doctrine, often referred to as the common interest 
exception.
72
 The common interest doctrine allows a client to avoid 
waiving the attorney-client privilege by disclosing an otherwise 
privileged communication to a third party when the communication 
relates to a common legal interest shared by the parties.
73
 
The common interest doctrine is often invoked to protect 
communications between parties on the same side of litigation and their 
separate attorneys.
74
 Some jurisdictions strictly limit application of the 
                                                     
70. See, e.g., In re Keeper of Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 
16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he party who invokes the privilege bears the burden of establishing that 
it applies to the communications at issue and that it has not been waived.”). 
71. See id.; Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016) 
(“Generally, communications made in the presence of third parties, whose presence is known to the 
[client], are not privileged from disclosure” because they are not deemed confidential.”) (quoting 
People v Harris, 442 N.E. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1982)). But see Sampson v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 
262 F.R.D. 469, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“As the party challenging the privileged communication, 
Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that Defendants waived the privilege.”). 
72. Courts and scholars refer to the common interest doctrine by many names, including the 
common interest exception. See infra Parts IV–V. While “exception” indicates correctly that the 
common interest doctrine is not a standalone privilege, the term “exception” causes its own 
problems by suggesting that the common interest analysis is separate and apart from the waiver 
analysis. See infra Part V. For that reason, this Comment uses “common interest doctrine.”  
73. See Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 213 P.3d 596, 601 (2009) (“The 
presence of a third person during the communication waives the privilege, unless the third 
person . . . has retained the attorney on a matter of ‘common interest.’”) (citations omitted).  
74. See, e.g., State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845, 854 (1953); Schmitt v. 
Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942). 
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common interest doctrine to co-parties in litigation that retain separate 
attorneys.
75
 In contrast, many jurisdictions extend the common interest 
doctrine to protect communications that relate to non-litigation common 
interests, such as prospectively seeking legal advice to comply with laws 
or regulations.
76
 To understand how this jurisdictional split evolved and 
what it means for the law of privilege, the next Part discusses the origins 
and development of the common interest doctrine itself. 
II. THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE EVOLVED FROM 
CRIMINAL LAW INTO A WIDESPREAD—YET MUDDLED—
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINE 
The common interest doctrine began as a “joint defense” doctrine in 
criminal cases.
77
 Over time it has expanded to cover a broader range of 
legal communications in both civil and criminal contexts.
78
 While many 
jurisdictions have adopted some form of the common interest doctrine, 
the details of the doctrine differ based on jurisdiction, and many 
jurisdictions have not adopted a common interest doctrine in the civil 
arena at all.
79
 This Part addresses the doctrine’s scope and history in the 
federal circuits and the states. 
A. The Common Interest Doctrine’s Broad Contours 
The common interest doctrine is still evolving, and many jurisdictions 
have yet to address or apply it at all.
80
 Yet the doctrine shares some traits 
among most of the jurisdictions that have adopted it.
81
 First, most 
common interest doctrine jurisdictions describe the common interest 
doctrine either as part of the general attorney-client privilege rule, or as 
an exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege, not as a separate, 
                                                     
75. See, e.g., Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 30 (adopting the litigation requirement).  
76. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 & n.6 (7th Cir. 2007) (clients 
need only “undertake a joint effort with respect to a common legal interest”).  
77. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822, 841–42 (1871) (reasoning that the exception 
was justified because the parties “had the same defen[s]e to make”).   
78. See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999); Schmitt, 2 N.W.2d 413 
(expanding the exception to civil cases). 
79. See infra Part III. 
80. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-501 (2016) (leaving attorney-client privilege to the common 
law). The Supreme Court of Georgia has not yet addressed the common interest doctrine. This 
pattern is followed in several other states, including Illinois (ILL. R. EVID. 502), Indiana (IND. R. 
EVID. 502), Iowa (IOWA R. EVID. 5.502), and others.  
81. See infra section II.C.1. 
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 Thus, the common interest doctrine only protects 
communications to third parties that would have already been covered 
by the attorney-client privilege if they were made in confidence between 
a client and the client’s attorney.83 For that reason, communications with 
a non-legal purpose are not covered. 
Second, the common interest doctrine protects communications 
between clients with separate attorneys.
84
 While some jurisdictions use 
the term “common interest” to describe application of the attorney-client 
privilege to separate clients with the same attorneys, that situation is 
generally already covered under separate principles of the common law 
attorney-client privilege.
85
 Throughout its history, from its inception as 
the joint-defense doctrine to the modern common interest doctrine, the 
common interest doctrine has operated to protect disclosures to separate 
attorneys that would otherwise waive the attorney-client privilege.
86
 The 
Restatement also takes this approach by expressly stating that the 
common interest doctrine applies to communications between clients 
that are “represented by separate attorneys.”87 
Third, disclosure to third parties other than those sharing a common 
legal interest waives the privilege.
88
 A common example is where a 
meeting of clients and their separate counsel happens to include a third 
party who is not a client with a common interest or an attorney of such a 
client. Imagine that officers of a corporate client hold an in-person 
                                                     
82. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted by at least eleven states, includes the common 
interest language in its “General Rule of Privilege.” UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1999). But see In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 362 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing the 
“Community-of-Interest (Or Common Interest) Privilege” (emphasis added)).  
83. For example, business communications without a legal component are generally not covered 
by the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 
Civ. 5125, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 671 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (communications with lawyer 
serving purely as negotiator not privileged). 
84. See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999) (protecting legal communications 
“by the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer 
to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and 
concerning a matter of common interest therein”).  
85. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 634. 
86. See Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 59.  
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) 
(“If two or more clients with a common interest in a . . . matter are represented by separate 
lawyers . . . a communication of any such client . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as against 
third persons.”) (emphasis added). 
88. See, e.g., Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y. 
2016) (“‘Generally, communications made in the presence of third parties, whose presence is known 
to the [client], are not privileged from disclosure’ because they are not deemed confidential.”) 
(quoting People v. Harris, 442 N.E. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1982)). 
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meeting with the corporation’s attorney and an outside advertising 
consultant. In this scenario, legal communications in the presence of the 
outside consultant waive the attorney-client privilege because they are 
disclosed to a third party that does not share a common legal interest 
with the corporation—although they may share a common business 
interest.
89
 Because the communication to that third party by definition 
cannot be for the purpose of securing legal counsel on the matter of 




Fourth, while jurisdictions differ as to how common the common 
interest must be, jurisdictions generally require the parties to be on the 
same side of some kind of legal issue. Co-parties in litigation therefore 
may generally invoke the common interest doctrine to prevent disclosure 
of their communications regarding litigation strategy with their separate 
counsel.
91
 But parties negotiating at arms-length generally cannot invoke 
the common interest doctrine because the interest in a successful 
negotiation is not a sufficiently common interest.
92
 For that reason, legal 
communications to a legal adversary’s attorney in settlement 
negotiations are generally not covered by the common interest 
doctrine—there is no common legal interest in a particular legal outcome 
because the parties’ legal objectives are different.93 The same goes for 
corporations negotiating a merger: until they sign a merger agreement, it 
is much less likely that they share a common legal interest because there 
is no shared legal interest in the resulting entity complying with the law 
before the parties have agreed to create the entity.
94
 
B. The Joint Defense Doctrine Emerged in a Criminal Case 
The modern common interest doctrine has its roots in criminal law 
with the joint defense doctrine.
95
 In 1871, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia in Chahoon v. Commonwealth held that three defendants in a 
criminal conspiracy case were entitled to the attorney-client privilege in 
regards to communications made in a private meeting with two of the 
                                                     
89. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). 
90. Id.  
91. See Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 626–27.  
92. King, supra note 55, at 1412–13 (“Most courts conclude that disclosures made during 
transaction negotiations work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
93. Id.  
94. Id.  
95. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822 (1871). 
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three defendants’ attorneys present.96 Importantly, no persons other than 
the defendants and their lawyers were present, as the presence of an 
unrelated third party would certainly have waived the privilege.
97
 
Although Chahoon did not fully define the criminal joint defense 
doctrine, the case forecasted some parameters of what would eventually 
evolve into the civil common interest doctrine. First, it applies to 
communications between a client and a separate attorney of another 
client.
98
 Second, the communications must be for a legal purpose shared 
in common between the clients.
99
 This means that communications 
between clients represented by separate attorneys without attorneys 
present are not covered because client-to-client conversations are de 
facto not for the purpose of obtaining legal counsel and thus are not 
protected by the attorney-client privilege in the first place. 
The Chahoon court justified the extension of the criminal attorney-
client privilege as follows: 
Under such circumstances, it was natural and reasonable, if not 
necessary, that these parties, thus charged with the same crimes, 
should meet together in consultation with their counsel, 
communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for 




While Chahoon was decided a century before Upjohn, the purpose of 
encouraging full disclosure is evident in the opinion.
101
 Communication 
between co-defendants and their counsel is important to ensure 
competent legal advice, and Chahoon allowed that kind of 
communication in the criminal arena. 
                                                     
96. Id. at 839–40. 
97. Id. at 839 (“There were present at that meeting all three of the accused, Chahoon, Sands and 
Sanxay; and John M. Gregory, counsel representing Sands, and John Lyon, counsel representing 
Sanxay. The counsel of Chahoon was absent. It does not appear that any other person was present 
on the occasion than those above named, and it may well be inferred that there was not.”).  
98. See id.; Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y. 
2016). 
99. Id.  
100. Chahoon, 62 Va. at 839.  
101. Id.  
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C. The Joint Defense Doctrine Expanded into a Civil Common 
Interest Doctrine That Has Gained Acceptance in Many 
Jurisdictions 
The criminal joint defense doctrine eventually evolved into a civil 
common interest doctrine. In 1942, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was 
the first court to adopt a civil common interest doctrine.
102
 In Schmitt v. 
Emery, the Court held that the statement of a civil defendant, made for 
the purpose of litigation, remained privileged when the statement was 
provided to a co-defendant’s counsel for a legal purpose.103 The parties 
had a joint legal interest in shielding the statement from disclosure, and 
the statement was provided to the co-defendant’s counsel “solely to 
accommodate [the attorney] and thereby to enable them to make their 
effort and aid more effective in the common cause of excluding the 
statement.”104 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not provide an extensive rationale 
for its holding.
105
 That said, the civil common interest doctrine furthers 
the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-client privilege that the 
Chahoon court relied on to create the criminal doctrine. Indeed, in a 
recent dissent in New York State’s highest court, justices supporting a 
broad common interest doctrine argued that full disclosure “furthers the 
goal of compliance with the law, thus benefitting not only clients but 
society in general.”106 This dissent also pointed out that “clients often 
seek legal advice specifically to comply with legal and regulatory 
mandates,”107 echoing Upjohn’s acknowledgement that full disclosure 
and effective representation are intertwined.
108
 
The civil common interest doctrine has gained broad acceptance. 
Every jurisdiction to address the doctrine applies it. The Restatement has 
also adopted civil common interest doctrine, as follows: 
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or 
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they 
agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a 
communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as 
                                                     
102. See Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Minn. 1942). 
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 417.  
105. See id.  
106. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 41 (N.Y. 2016) 
(Rivera, J., dissenting). 
107. Id.  
108. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). 
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privileged under §§ 68–72 that relates to the matter is privileged 
as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the 




Additionally, most commentators accept that at least some form of the 
common interest doctrine is good law.
110
 
The broad acceptance of the common interest doctrine is likely 
because it is necessary to avoid unequal application of the rules of 
evidence to clients who are represented by separate—as opposed to the 
same—counsel, even though the legal matter of representation is 
identical. For example, imagine two plaintiffs file a joint complaint 
against an employer for wrongful termination. Next, the plaintiffs meet 
in person with their joint attorney to discuss their litigation strategy. The 
attorney-client privilege protects these communications. Now imagine 
the same set of facts, but instead of a single attorney, each plaintiff 
retains separate counsel, who work together on the case. Assume that 
each plaintiff shares a common legal interest: a judgment against the 
defendant. Because Plaintiff One and the attorney for Plaintiff Two do 
not have a lawyer-client relationship, that attorney is a third party with 
respect to Plaintiff One. In this scenario, absent the common interest 
doctrine, a litigation strategy meeting with both plaintiffs and both 
attorneys in the room would result in third-party waiver of the attorney-
client privilege. 
Some commentators argue against the common interest doctrine on 
the basis that the doctrine is contrary to the “traditional approach of 
applying the [attorney-client] privilege narrowly.”111 The common 
interest doctrine technically does extend the attorney-client privilege to 
communications between two parties that do not have an attorney-client 
relationship themselves.
112
 However, this is not the only context in 
which courts have extended the privilege to third parties when necessary 
to ensure sound legal advice. For example, courts extend the privilege to 
                                                     
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
110. Even in more restrictive jurisdictions, the debate over the common interest doctrine tends to 
focus less on whether it should exist at all, and more on what the proper scope of the exception 
should be. Compare Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38 (majority opinion) (“[A]ny benefits that may attend 
such an expansion of the doctrine are outweighed by the substantial loss of relevant evidence, as 
well as the potential for abuse.”), with id. at 43 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (noting that “[s]everal legal 
commentators also support a broad application of the privilege”). 
111. Grace M. Giesel, Comment, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not 
Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 475, 559 (2011). 
112. Id. at 479 (“When the privilege is applied in the allied lawyer setting, however, the privilege 
protects communications that are not between an attorney and that attorney’s clients.”). 
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legal communications in the presence of a translator.
113
 Additionally, the 
broad acceptance of the doctrine indicates that jurisdictions understand 
the fundamental unfairness that would result from the above-described 
scenario.
114
 The jurisdictions adopting the common interest doctrine 
recognize that as long as the parties can prove that a common legal 
interest exists, the doctrine should apply.
115
 
Despite the areas of overlap, the common interest doctrine remains 
shrouded in confusion and ambiguity. Jurisdictions differ on numerous 
aspects of the doctrine, including the circumstances in which it applies, 
the terminology used to refer to the doctrine, and even whether the 




D. Anything but Common: The Muddled State of the Common Interest 
Doctrine 
Since Schmitt, the common interest doctrine has become muddled in 
both nomenclature and application. Major differences include how 
common the common interest must be, whether the common interest 
doctrine requires a written agreement, and who may waive the privilege 
under the common interest doctrine.
117
 This subsection addresses the 
confused terminology and status of the doctrine. The following 
subsection addresses a particularly impactful jurisdictional split: some 
                                                     
113. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).  
114. In many cases, separate counsel may suggest less commonality of interest than in the joint 
client setting. However, the common interest exception still requires parties to show a “common 
legal interest.” See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
multiple clients represented by the same attorney must have nearly identical legal interests for the 
attorney to represent them, whereas in the separate-attorney context, “courts can afford to relax the 
degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying that their attorneys’ ability to 
represent them zealously and single-mindedly will suffer”).  
115. Notably, the presence of even a single unrepresented party may preclude application of the 
common interest exception, because at that point the communication regarding that third party 
cannot be for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. 
Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Under the strict confines of the common-interest doctrine, the 
lack of representation for the remaining parties vitiates any claim to a privilege.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“If two 
or more clients with a common interest in a . . . matter are represented by separate lawyers . . . a 
communication of any such client . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as against third 
persons.”)).  
116. See infra section II.D.  
117. Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 68–90 (discussing these differences and advocating for a 
uniform approach).   
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jurisdictions apply the common interest doctrine to legal 
communications only in the context of litigation. 
Courts have conflated several similar terms and used the term 
“common interest” to refer to related but distinct privilege doctrines.118 
The fact that several jurisdictions have not yet addressed the common 
interest doctrine—or only addressed it indirectly—has furthered the 
confusion.
119
 Commentators have begun to cry out for a consistent 
statement of the circumstances to which the common interest doctrine 
applies.
120
 Indeed, it is difficult to define the scope of the doctrine when 
it is alternately referred to by several different terms—terms that may 
refer to a completely different doctrine in another jurisdiction.
121
 
One of many examples of this confusion features prominently in the 
1994 D.C. Circuit case, In re Sealed Case.
122
 First, the Court of Appeals 
uses the term “common interest privilege,”123 which implies—
incorrectly—that the common interest doctrine is a standalone privilege 
as opposed to part of the attorney-client privilege. Second, the party 
refers to the “joint defense privilege” as only applying to the “new 
phenomenon”124 of “joint defense arrangements”125—even though the 
“joint defense doctrine” applied to co-defendants in civil cases as far 
back as 1942.
126
 Third, neither the Court nor the party in the case 
claiming the common interest exception adequately distinguishes it from 
the “joint defense privilege,” from which the common interest exception 
evolved.
127
 Fourth, another court following the citations in the case will 
find very different formulations of the exception, making it difficult to 
define and apply. 
In re Sealed Case is useful not only as an example of the confused 
state of the doctrine generally, but also as an example of the difficulty 
this confusion creates for practitioners who seek to invoke the exception 
on behalf of their clients. The appellant in In re Sealed Case claimed the 
                                                     
118. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 632–34.   
119. See infra Part IV.  
120. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 65; Schaffzin, supra note 42; Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking 
Common Sense for the Common Law of Common Interest in the D.C. Circuit, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 
833 (2016).  
121. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 632–34.   
122. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
123. Id. at 719.  
124. Id.  
125. Id.  
126. See Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Minn. 1942). 
127. See generally In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715.  
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“joint-defense privilege” at the court below.128 The United States as 
respondent on appeal attempted to distinguish the “joint-defense 
privilege” from the “common interest privilege,” and argued that the 
appellant waived the latter because he did not raise it below.
129
 The 
Court rejected this argument on the basis that “[a]lthough the 
Government is correct in noting that the appellant concentrated his 
argument on the joint defense privilege in district court,
 
he also asserted 
the common interest privilege.”130 To support its conclusion, the Court 
of Appeals quoted a portion of the district court record in which the 
appellant referred to a “common law privilege about common interests:” 
In terms of the joint defense issue, your honor—and I know the 
court knows this—there’s a common law privilege, not 
pertaining to joint defense agreements per se—joint defense 
agreements are a new phenomenon—but there’s a common law 
privilege about common interests. If clients have common 




The Court of Appeals then stated its formulation of the common 
interest doctrine, but in doing so it cited sources that provide very 
different formulations of the doctrine.
132
 Finally, the Court of Appeals 
remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine 




The confused state of the common interest doctrine has real 
consequences. The less sure clients are that the common interest doctrine 
applies to a particular legal communication, the more likely clients are to 
refrain from fully disclosing facts to their attorneys. As the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Upjohn, “if the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict 
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected.”134 
                                                     
128. Id. at 719. 
129. Id.  
130. Id.  
131. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
132. Id. (citing both the Fifth Circuit, which applies a narrow formulation of the common interest 
exception, and Prof. Wigmore, who provides a broader formulation of the common interest 
exception).   
133. Id.  
134. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
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Commentators have begun to take note of this confusion and have 
made valiant efforts to clarify the doctrine and to define its scope.
135
 
Consistent terminology across jurisdictions—at the very least—would 
be immensely helpful. These commentators generally agree that the 
common interest doctrine should be defined so that 1) it can be easily 
distinguished from related but distinct doctrines, and 2) to make clear 
that the common interest doctrine is part of the attorney-client privilege 
and waiver analyses, not a separate, standalone privilege.
136
 
While a uniform terminology is not out of the question, a uniform 
scope of the common interest doctrine is far less likely to become 
reality. In addition to the confused nomenclature, jurisdictions differ on 
a particularly important doctrinal aspect of the exception: some 
jurisdictions only apply the common interest doctrine to privileged 
communications made during or in anticipation of litigation, while 
others allow the doctrine to cover legal communications made without 
the looming threat of litigation.
137
 Practitioners who seek to invoke the 
common interest doctrine are well-served by understanding their 
jurisdiction’s position on the litigation requirement. 
III. JURISDICTIONS DIFFER ON WHETHER PARTIES CAN 
INVOKE THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE TO 
PROTECT LEGAL COMMUNICATIONS THAT DO NOT 
RELATE TO LITIGATION 
One of the most impactful differences between jurisdictions is 
whether the common interest doctrine only applies in the context of 
some form of litigation, or whether it also applies to non-litigation legal 
contexts such as estate or business planning. The approach adopted by 
Delaware,
138
 most federal circuits that have addressed the common 
interest doctrine,
139
 and the Restatement
140
 allows the common interest 
doctrine to apply to both litigated and non-litigated matters. 
                                                     
135. See Fischer, supra note 65; Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 69; Sunshine, supra note 120.   
136. See Fischer, supra note 65; Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 69; Sunshine, supra note 120.   
137. See infra Part III.  
138. See D.R.E. 502(b) (attorney-client privilege covers legal communications that relate to a 
“matter of common interest”) (omitting a litigation requirement). 
139. See In re Regents of Univ. of Calif., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Schaeffler v. 
United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 
(3d Cir. 2007); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987). 
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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In contrast, the Uniform Rules of Evidence (“URE”), adopted by a 
number of states, requires a “pending action” in order for a party to 
invoke the common interest doctrine.
141
 Under the URE approach, co-
parties or potential co-parties in litigation can invoke the common 
interest doctrine, but clients obtaining legal advice in the absence of 
litigation cannot—even though common legal interests occur in many 
non-litigation contexts.
142
 For example, entities that have signed a 
merger agreement may not face immediate litigation, but they share a 
common legal interest in ensuring that the ensuing merger transaction 
complies with the relevant statutes and regulations. Even in jurisdictions 
that impose a litigation requirement, the scope of that requirement 




A. The Majority Federal Approach Does Not Impose a Litigation 
Requirement 
A majority of federal circuits that have addressed the common interest 
doctrine do not require actual, pending, or anticipated litigation. These 











 Circuits. The First Circuit has a less-developed common interest 
doctrine jurisprudence but has stated in dicta that “the privilege 
sometimes may apply outside the context of actual litigation,”149 placing 
it somewhat close to the majority of federal circuits. The Eighth Circuit, 
while not as clear as the others, has noted that “[t]he rule applies ‘not 
only if litigation is current or imminent but, consistently with the rest of 
the Standard, whenever the communication was made in order to 
facilitate the rendition of legal services to each of the clients involved in 
                                                     
141. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999); see also The Litigation Requirement in 
States, infra notes 267–317 tbl.2.  
142. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b). 
143. See id. (“pending action”); Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 
N.E.3d 30, 38 (N.Y. 2016) (“pending or anticipated”); O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 
299 (N.J. 2014) (“actual or anticipated”); Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1244 (Mississippi 
2003) (“pending action”).  
144. See In re Regents of Univ. of Calif., 101 F.3d at 1390–91.  
145. See Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015).   
146. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007). 
147. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007). 
148. See United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987). 
149. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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the conference.’”150 However, the Ninth Circuit, which does not require 




The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that imposes a concrete litigation 
requirement. Under this approach, a plaintiff must show: 
[A] palpable threat of litigation at the time of the 
communication, rather than a mere awareness that one’s 
questionable conduct might some day result in litigation, before 
communications between one possible future co-defendant and 
another . . . could qualify for protection.
152
 
Absent actual litigation or a “palpable threat” of litigation in the Fifth 
Circuit, a party cannot invoke the common interest doctrine.
153
 
The remaining circuits either have not addressed a litigation 
requirement or are unclear on whether they adopt one. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit appeared to reject the litigation requirement when it stated 
that “it is unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress for this 
privilege to apply.”154 Unfortunately, in that case the Fourth Circuit 
applied what it called the common interest doctrine to facts in which 
multiple clients were represented by a single attorney
155—a formulation 
that describes in reality the co-client doctrine, not the common interest 
doctrine. For that reason, it remains unclear whether the Fourth Circuit 
would apply the litigation requirement to the commonly understood 
formulation of the common interest doctrine in which separate attorneys 
represent clients with common legal interests. 
  
                                                     
150. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 939 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting JACK 
B. WEINSTEIN ET. AL., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503[06] (1987) [hereinafter 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE]). 
151. See United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2012); Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417. 
152. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 2011). 
153. Id.  
154. Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
155. Id.  
15 - Franz.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  3:40 PM 
2017] LIMITATION TO THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE 1005 
 
Table 1: 





























The majority approach of the federal circuits that reject a litigation 
requirement is echoed by the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers
159
 and by Professor Weinstein.
160
 The Restatement is the most 
explicit of all in rejecting a litigation requirement: 
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or 
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they 
agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a 
communication of any such client . . . that relates to the matter 
[of common interest] is privileged as against third persons.
161
 
The uncertainty regarding the scope of the common interest doctrine 
on the federal level might have been avoided by a proposed Federal Rule 
                                                     
156. Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 
(7th Cir. 2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 939 (8th Cir. 1997); In re 
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United States v. Zolin, 809 
F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987). 
157. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d at 711 (“[T]here must be a palpable threat of litigation at 
the time of the communication, rather than a mere awareness that one’s questionable conduct might 
some day result in litigation, before communications between one possible future co-defendant and 
another . . . could qualify for protection.”). 
158. In re IPCom GmbH & Co., KG, 428 F. App’x 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Hunton & 
Williams v. U.S. DOJ, 590 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining to address whether the presence 
of adverse party is a prerequisite for invoking the common interest doctrine); In re Qwest 
Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 
1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
privilege sometimes may apply outside the context of actual litigation.”).  
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
160. WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 150, § 503.21[2]. 
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) 
(emphasis added).   
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of Evidence 503 in 1972. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee 
proposed thirteen specific rules on privileges, including Rule 503, which 
“would have codified the attorney-client privilege and would have 
recognized the common interest doctrine.”162 The proposed Rule 
explicitly rejected the pending litigation requirement in the URE in favor 
of the approach adopted by Delaware, requiring only a “matter” of 
common interest: 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client, (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer 
or his lawyer’s representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the 
lawyer’s representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer 
representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4) 
between representatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client.
163
 
However, “Congress rejected Article V of the Court’s Proposed Rules 
in its entirety, including Proposed Rule 503(b).”164 Instead, the House 
Judiciary Committee “through a single rule, 501, left the law of 
privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges shall 
continue to be developed by the courts of the United States.”165 The 
Advisory Committee Notes indicate Congress’s concern that “[m]any of 
these rules contained controversial modifications or restrictions upon 
common law privileges.”166 By not enacting a specific Rule for each 
privilege, “the House provided that privileges shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience.”167 This standard provides 
wide discretion for judges to fashion and interpret privileges. It also has 
the effect of allowing judges to consider the practical consequences of 
the privileges. The result is disparate application of the common interest 
doctrine across federal circuits,
168
 with some federal circuits rejecting 
the litigation requirement, some adopting it, and still more unclear. 
                                                     
162. Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 87. 
163. Id. (emphasis added); see also PAUL R. RICE, 1 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES § 2:1 (2d ed. 1999).   
164. Id.  
165. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment. 
166. Id. 
167. Id.  
168. See The Litigation Requirement in the Federal Circuits, supra notes 156–58 tbl.1.  
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B. States Differ Widely on the Litigation Requirement 
As in the federal circuits, there is no clear majority for or against a 
litigation requirement in the states.
169
 The litigation requirement received 




A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing a confidential communication 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client . . . (3) by the client or a 
representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a 
lawyer representing another party in a pending action and 
concerning a matter of common interest therein . . . .
171
 
It is unclear why the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)—the drafter 
of the URE— included the litigation requirement. The Comment to Rule 
502 is silent on the “pending action” language.172 The ULC states on its 
website that the URE “reflects closely the federal rules of evidence.”173 
However, Rule 501 provides that the federal common law governs 
privileges, and the majority federal circuit approach rejects this litigation 
requirement.
174
 One scholar suggests that “[m]any state legislatures 
enacted evidentiary rules modeled after Proposed [Federal] Rule 503(b), 
which was never enacted by Congress.”175 However, if that were the 
case, one would expect these states to use the “common interest” 
language in that proposed rule, rather than the “pending action” 
language in the URE. 
                                                     
169. See The Litigation Requirement in the States, infra notes 267–317 tbl.2.  
170. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999) (“General Rule of privilege. A client 
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential 
communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to 
the client (1) between the client or a representative of the client and the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer; (2) between the lawyer and a representative of the lawyer; (3) by the 
client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a 
lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and 
concerning a matter of common interest therein; (4) between representatives of the client or 
between the client and a representative of the client; or (5) among lawyers and their representatives 
representing the same client.”) (emphasis added).   
171. Id. (emphasis added). 
172. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). 
173. Rules of Evidence, UNIF. LAW COMM’N: THE NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Rules%20of%20Evidence [https://perma. 
cc/26JY-H2S9].  
174. See supra section III.A. 
175. See Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 86 n.135.   
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Further, the rationale for adopting the URE’s “pending action” 
language does not appear in state cases interpreting URE 502(b). At least 
one state court refers to their URE-based attorney-client privilege statute 
as “essentially codif[ying] the common law attorney-client privilege,”176 
with no discussion of how the litigation requirement is nowhere to be 
found in all but one federal circuit’s formulation of the common interest 
doctrine. 
At least eleven states have adopted the URE’s common interest 
language without change.
177
 Many more states have not adopted the 
URE’s attorney-client privilege language, and many states’ rules differ 
from the URE’s in significant ways.178 Significant differences exist even 
among some states that have adopted a common interest doctrine similar 
to that in the URE.
179
 For example, while the URE requires a pending 
action, New Jersey applies the common interest doctrine to 
“communications for different parties if the disclosure is made due to 
actual or anticipated litigation for the purpose of furthering a common 
interest.”180 
The differences are even greater among states that have not adopted 
the URE. For example, Delaware, a major jurisdiction for corporate 
transactions, applies a relatively broad version of the common interest 
doctrine and rejects a litigation requirement.
181
 Delaware’s relevant 
statutory provision, D.R.E. 502(b)(3), states that the attorney-client 
privilege covers disclosures to an attorney or client “representing 
another in a matter of common interest.”182 
In contrast to Delaware’s statutory clarity, many other states have not 
addressed the common interest doctrine at all.
183
 Among the non-URE 
                                                     
176. Hampton Police Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Hampton, 20 A.3d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2011). 
177. See Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 36 n.2 (N.Y. 
2016) (citing ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); KY. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); ME. R. 
EVID. 502(b)(3); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); 12 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(3) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b)(3) (2017); TEX. R. 
EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). But see DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (permitting disclosure 
to an attorney or client “representing another in a matter of common interest”)). 
178. See The Litigation Requirement in the States, infra notes 267–317 tbl.2.  
179. See Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1259 (Miss. 2003) (describing the common 
interest exception as its own privilege: “The defendants to this suit now assert the attorney client 
privilege, the work product privilege, and the common interest privilege”).  
180. O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 317 (N.J. 2014) (emphasis added). “Pending 
action” is a strict requirement that does not allow the doctrine to cover anticipated litigation.  
181. DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
182. Id. 
183. These states include Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (2017)) and Montana 
(MONT. CODE  ANN. § 26-1-803 (2017)).   
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states that have adopted the common interest doctrine, many have yet to 
address whether it requires litigation,
184
 leaving clients and attorneys 
simply to guess whether their common interest communications are 
privileged in the absence of some threat of litigation.
185
 Washington 
State’s common interest doctrine jurisprudence is an example of this 
uncertainty. The State of Washington does not define the common 
interest doctrine by statute,
186
 and Washington State courts have not yet 
addressed whether the doctrine requires the threat of pending or 
anticipated litigation. The only examples of the common interest 
doctrine thus far in Washington involved actual or potential co-parties in 
litigation. 
For example, in State v. Emmanuel, the Washington State Supreme 
Court held that the doctrine applied when two parties and their counsel 
communicated for the purposes of pursuing a common defense.
187
 
However, no Washington State opinion expressly requires pending or 
anticipated litigation, and some opinions describe the privilege in a way 
that suggests pending or anticipated litigation might not be required.
188
 
For example, in Sanders v. State, the Washington State Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court’s application of the common interest doctrine to 
communications related to litigation, but described the common interest 
doctrine to apply if “the third person is necessary for the communication, 
or has retained the attorney on a matter of ‘common interest.’”189 This 
broader language suggests that Washington may not adopt a litigation 
requirement. 
Many courts have made valiant efforts to clear up the confusion in 
their jurisdictions regarding the common interest doctrine, though 
attempts to clarify have often only muddied the waters further.
190
 Others 
have attained some level of clarity, though not always without 
consequences for the doctrine.
191
 A primary example of the latter is the 
                                                     
184. See State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845, 855 (1953) (applying the 
common interest doctrine in the litigation context, but not addressing the common interest doctrine 
outside of the litigation context). 
185. Id. 
186. See generally WASH. R. EVID. 501–02. 
187. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d at 815, 259 P.2d at 855.  
188. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 169 Wash. 2d 827, 854, 240 P.3d 120, 134 (2010).  
189. Id. (“The presence of a third person during the communication waives the privilege, unless 
the third person is necessary for the communication, or has retained the attorney on a matter of 
‘common interest.’”) (quoting Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 213 P.3d 
596, 601 (2009) (en banc)). 
190. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 632–34.   
191. See infra Part V.   
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recent case of Ambac v. Countrywide,
192
 in which New York’s highest 
court adopted a pending or anticipated litigation requirement. 
IV. NEW YORK ADOPTED A LITIGATION REQUIREMENT IN 
AMBAC V. COUNTRYWIDE 
In the midst of the confused state of the common interest doctrine, 
New York’s highest court issued an opinion on the litigation requirement 
that is significant for two reasons. First, the Ambac v. Countrywide 
majority presented an alluringly clear analysis of the scope and purpose 
of the common interest doctrine that is sorely lacking in other 
jurisdictions.
193
 Second, the dissent presented an equally clear rebuttal 




The Ambac court held that in addition to the common legal interest 
requirement, the common interest doctrine is also subject to a litigation 
requirement: the doctrine does not apply to legal communications 
between a corporation and another corporation’s lawyers unless those 
communications relate to “pending or anticipated litigation.”195 While a 
model of clarity compared to most other cases discussing the litigation 
requirement, Ambac’s framing of the common interest doctrine as an 
exception to waiver
196
 creates significant problems for the doctrine and 
justifies a strict litigation requirement. 
A. The Ambac Majority Framed the Common Interest Doctrine as an 
“Exception” to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Defended 
the Litigation Requirement 
The Ambac majority’s definition of the common interest doctrine as 
an exception to third-party waiver
197
 allowed the majority to assign 
different purposes to the common interest doctrine than to the attorney-
client privilege as a whole.
198
 
                                                     
192. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016). 
193. Id.  
194. Id. (Rivera, J., dissenting).  
195. Id. at 38. “Anticipated” is broader than the U.R.E.’s “pending action,” but Ambac does not 
clearly define the scope of “anticipated litigation.” The dissent criticizes the majority opinion for 
this reason. See id. at 48 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. at 40. 
197. Id. at 39.  
198. Id.  
15 - Franz.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  3:40 PM 
2017] LIMITATION TO THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE 1011 
 
In Ambac, Bank of America and Countrywide Insurance publicly 
announced a merger plan on January 11, 2008, and closed the deal on 
July 1, 2008.
199
 The issue was whether the companies shared a common 
legal interest between those dates such that the common interest doctrine 
applied and shielded from discovery their communications with each 
other’s lawyers.200 The court held that the common interest doctrine 
required the presence of pending or anticipated litigation, and because 
Bank of America and Countrywide did not provide evidence of such, the 
doctrine did not apply and the attorney-client privilege was waived.
201
 
The court rejected Bank of America’s argument that the constant threat 
of litigation in mergers met the anticipated litigation requirement, and 
the court required the threat of litigation to be specific, not general.
202
 
In adopting the litigation requirement, Ambac presented a clear 
version of the common interest doctrine as a whole. In an attempt to 
resolve the confusion surrounding the terminology and operation of the 
doctrine, the majority first determined that the general rule is that the 
presence of a third-party waives the attorney-client privilege.
203
 It then 
presented the common interest doctrine as an exception to that waiver.
204
 
This allowed the majority to distinguish between the purposes of the 
exception and the purposes of the attorney-client privilege as a whole. 
The majority acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege is not tied 
to the anticipation of litigation.
205
 However, it concluded that “the 
common interest doctrine does not need to be coextensive with the 
privilege because the doctrine itself is not an evidentiary privilege or an 
independent basis for the attorney-client privilege.”206 
Once it defined the common interest doctrine as an exception to 
waiver, the majority justified the litigation requirement on several 
grounds. In a nod to Upjohn, the majority acknowledged that in some 
cases “the threat of mandatory disclosure may chill the parties’ exchange 
of privileged information and therefore thwart any desire to coordinate 
legal strategy.”207 But it determined that the threat of chilled 
communication is lowest in non-litigation settings: 
                                                     
199. Id. at 32.  
200. Id. at 33. 
201. Id. at 40.  
202. Id. at 38.  
203. Id. at 35. 
204. Id.  
205. Id. at 39. 
206. Id.  
207. Id. at 38.  
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[N]o evidence has been presented here that privileged 
communication-sharing outside the context of litigation is 
necessary to achieve those objectives . . . [W]hen parties share 
attorney-client communications for planning purposes outside of 
the specter of anticipated litigation, such as when parties 
cooperate to strengthen or obtain patent protection . . . , it is 




The majority went on to conclude that “when businesses share a 
common interest in closing a complex transaction, their shared interest 
in the transaction’s completion is already an adequate incentive for 
exchanging information necessary to achieve that end.”209 
After concluding that there is a low disclosure benefit to the litigation 
requirement, the majority expressed great concern with its costs.
210
 The 
majority asserted that applying the common interest doctrine to non-
litigation-related legal communications “could result in the loss of 
evidence of a wide range of communications between parties who assert 
common legal interests but who really have only nonlegal or exclusively 
business interests to protect.”211 The majority stated that absent the 
litigation requirement “the potential for abuse [of the common interest 
doctrine] is sufficiently great, and the accompanying benefits so few,” 
that “expansion” is not warranted.212 The majority also asserted that their 
approach “seems to have been the common law rule”213 and that “at least 
eleven states have statutorily restricted the common interest doctrine to 
communications made in furtherance of ongoing litigation.”214 
B. The Ambac Dissent Rejected the Litigation Requirement 
The Ambac dissent rejected the notion that the purpose of the 
common interest doctrine is distinct from the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege as a whole.
215
 By doing so, the dissent rejected the 
                                                     
208. Id. 
209. Id.  
210. Id.   
211. Id. This statement is somewhat confounding given that the attorney-client privilege does not 
apply to nonlegal communications in the first place.   
212. Id. at 39. 
213. Id. at 36 n.2. 
214. The Ambac majority did not address the fact that the majority of federal circuits that have 
adopted the common interest doctrine take the opposite approach. 
215. Id. at 44–45 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
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The dissent began with Upjohn’s purpose of full disclosure.217 It then 
noted that the attorney-client privilege itself is not tied to the 
contemplation of litigation because: 
[L]itigation may not be the motivating factor leading to a 
client’s communication of private information. Rather, “[l]egal 
advice is often sought, and rendered, precisely to avoid 
litigation, or facilitate compliance with the law, or simply to 
guide a client’s course of conduct” . . . . All the more so in the 
corporate context . . . .
218
 
The dissent then rejected the litigation requirement and argued that the 
requirement “ignores the unique common legal interests of parties to a 
merger.”219 It also noted that “the majority of federal courts . . . and a 
significant number of state jurisdictions . . . have held that the privilege 
applies even if litigation is not pending or reasonably anticipated.”220 
In contrast to the majority, the dissent relied on the attorney-client 
privilege’s purpose in analyzing the common interest doctrine. The 
dissent relied on Upjohn to note that corporate clients “often seek legal 
advice specifically to comply with legal and regulatory mandates,”221 
and that “the majority fails to identify any distinction between coparties 
or person who reasonably anticipate litigation, and parties committed to 
the completion of a merger”222 regarding how likely each party is to seek 
full and frank legal advice. 
Further, the dissent rejected the majority’s concern with abuse of the 
common interest doctrine as “purely speculative,” and argued that “there 
is certainly as much or more potential [for abuse] in assertions of the 
[common interest doctrine] by those ‘anticipating’ litigation and seeking 
to shield communications from a potential adversary.”223 The dissent 
also argued that any attempted abuse of the common interest doctrine 
absent a litigation requirement can “be addressed through our legal 
                                                     
216. Id.  
217. Id. at 41 (“Effective representation furthers the goal of compliance with the law, thus 
benefitting not only clients but society in general.”).  
218. Id. at 41–42. 
219. Id. at 43. 
220. Id. at 42–43. 
221. Id. at 41. 
222. Id. at 45.  
223. Id. 
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system’s existing methods for preventing and sanctioning obstruction of 
proper discovery.”224 
The dissent further asserted that the Ambac majority’s formulation of 
the litigation requirement actually creates more confusion about the 
scope of the common interest doctrine.
225
 Under the majority’s 
formulation, a party seeking to invoke the common interest doctrine 
must show that litigation is either “ongoing or reasonably 
anticipated.”226 The dissent seized on this standard, and argued that the 
majority “ignores the inherent vagueness in the term. Indeed, whether 
the parties reasonably anticipated litigation inevitably requires judicial 
consideration of case-specific facts.”227 
C. Ambac’s Alluring Clarity is Misleading 
Ambac appears to clarify and simplify a muddled doctrine, but it 
creates more problems than it solves.
228
 The Ambac majority and dissent 
define the common interest doctrine using clear and consistent terms.
229
 
Early in its opinion, the majority acknowledged that the common interest 
doctrine “has come to be known by many names”230 and stated that the 
doctrine is not an independent privilege but an “exception to the general 
rule that communications shared with third parties are not privileged.”231 
Both the majority and dissent also made clear that the common interest 
doctrine applies “where two or more clients separately retain counsel to 
advise them on matters of common legal interest,”232 thereby 
distinguishing the common interest doctrine from the co-client doctrines 
                                                     
224. Id.  
225. See id.  
226. Id. at 39 n.4. 
227. Id. at 45. 
228. Despite the recency of Ambac, one court has already cited the decision as persuasive 
authority in interpreting South Carolina privilege law. See Wellin v. Wellin, 2016 WL 5539523, at 
*12 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2016) (“The [common interest] doctrine is unquestionably available under 
federal and New York privilege law, which is at least suggestive of South Carolina courts’ position 
on the issue, given South Carolina courts’ tendency to cite to New York or federal privilege law.”) 
(citing Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 43 (N.Y. 2016)). 
229. See generally Ambac, 57 N.E.3d 30. In contrast to cases like In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (see supra section IV.D), Ambac consistently uses the term “common interest 
doctrine” and does not mix it up with distinct terms like “joint defense doctrine,” “joint client 
exception,” and so forth. Ambac also consistently refers to the common interest doctrine as applying 
to representation on a matter of common interest by separate attorneys.  
230. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 35 n.1.  
231. Id.   
232. Id. at 35.   
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with which it is so often confused. Moreover, the majority and dissent’s 
disagreements about the scope of the common interest doctrine are 
clearly delineated. 
However, buried beneath the surface of the opinions are major 
doctrinal differences between the majority and dissent that have real 
consequences for clients, lawyers, and society as a whole. While the 
dissent argued forcefully against the litigation requirement, it did not 
make a direct attack on the majority’s framing of the common interest 
doctrine as an exception to waiver of attorney-client privilege. Arguably, 
the dissent implicitly rejected this framing by referring to it as the 
common interest “doctrine.”233 Further, by asserting that the litigation 
requirement should be rejected because it “does not derive from the 
common-law roots of the attorney-client privilege,”234 the dissent may 
have implicitly rejected the majority’s framing of the doctrine as a 
separate, standalone exception to waiver of attorney-client privilege. 
However, by not making a frontal attack on the idea of the common 
interest doctrine as an “exception,” the dissent may have inadvertently 
muddied the waters of the common interest doctrine further. Indeed, the 
litigation requirement should be rejected precisely because the common 
interest doctrine is not an exception to waiver, but rather part of the 
waiver analysis itself and therefore subject to the purposes of the 
attorney-client privilege. 
V. AMBAC’S LITIGATION REQUIREMENT IS DOCTRINALLY 
UNSOUND AND AT ODDS WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Federal and state jurisdictions should reject Ambac’s litigation 
requirement for both doctrinal and practical reasons. First, the common 
interest doctrine should serve the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-
client privilege in Upjohn: to encourage the kind of full disclosure from 
clients to attorneys in order to enable attorneys to provide competent 
legal advice.
235
 This is particularly important in the world of major 
corporate transactions, in which two separate entities with separate 
counsel must work together to ensure compliance with an enormous 
                                                     
233. Id. at 43 (Rivera, J., dissenting).  
234. Id.  
235. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). 
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number of complex laws and regulations.
236
 The litigation requirement is 
contrary to that purpose.
237
 Given that the attorney-client privilege itself 
is not limited to the litigation context, a protected “common legal 
interest” communication should not be so limited. Second, the cost of 
rejecting the litigation requirement is low because as a part of attorney-
client privilege, the common interest doctrine only protects legal 
communications—not business communications or underlying facts.238 
Finally, the litigation requirement has practical consequences: it 
disincentivizes full disclosure, and encourages potential plaintiffs to 
engage in gamesmanship by withholding the threat of litigation until the 
last possible moment. These practical consequences will likely lead to a 
lower quality of legal advice, less compliance with the law, and more 
litigation. 
A. Ambac Mischaracterizes the Common Interest Doctrine as an 
Exception to Third-Party Waiver and Thereby Restricts its 
Application in a Manner Contrary to the Attorney-Client 
Privilege’s Purpose 
Every state and federal circuit accepts that the attorney-client 
privilege itself applies in non-litigation contexts. The privilege applies to 
corporations as well as individuals,
239
 and it applies in both litigation and 
non-litigation settings.
240
 The common interest doctrine should as well. 
By characterizing the common interest doctrine as an exception to 
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the Ambac majority arbitrarily limits 
its application to legal communications made in anticipation of 
litigation. The majority describes the common interest doctrine as “an 
exception to the general rule that communications made in the presence 
of or to a third party are not protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.”241 This formulation allows the majority to limit the 
                                                     
236. King, supra note 55, at 1433 n.132 (“Heavy government regulation of corporations increases 
the likelihood of government litigation against corporations, but also renders corporations more 
vulnerable to suit by private parties.”); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.   
237. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. 
238.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2000); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96. 
239. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.  
240. See, e.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(attorney-client privilege applied to submission of invention record to corporate legal counsel for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice); Adler v. Greenfield, 990 N.E.2d 1219, 1237 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2016) (attorney-client privilege applied to legal, estate-planning oriented communications between 
attorney and client’s representative).   
241. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 37 (N.Y. 2016). 
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application of the doctrine in a way it could not limit attorney-client 
privilege as a whole, to communications made while litigation is 
pending or anticipated: “[w]hile it is true that the attorney-client 
privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation, the common 
interest doctrine does not need to be coextensive with the privilege 
because the doctrine itself is not an evidentiary privilege or an 
independent basis for the attorney-client privilege.”242 In the common 
interest context, the majority first determines that waiver has 
presumptively occurred—and thus the privilege is vitiated—and then 
fashions a narrow subset of attorney-client privilege and applies it to 
legal communications in only one context: that of pending or anticipated 
litigation. This creates a hurdle to protection in other circumstances, 
even those in which parties meet the other “common interest” elements. 
Doctrinally, however, the analytical process should be the reverse. 
First, courts should look to the nature of the communication to determine 
whether the client meets the elements of the attorney-client privilege. In 
doing so, if a legal communication was disclosed to a third party who 
shares a common legal interest, then courts should determine that there 
simply has been no waiver. In that sense, the common interest doctrine is 
a point of analysis to determine whether waiver has occurred at all—not 
an exception to disclosure when waiver has occurred. 
This distinction matters because if the common interest doctrine is 
framed as a part of the waiver analysis, it is subject to the full disclosure 
purpose of attorney-client privilege, as opposed to a separate exception 
for which courts can create a separate analysis that is not subject to the 
purposes of Upjohn. Part of the waiver analysis is the parties’ 
expectations of what will remain private.
243
 If clients make legal 
communications in the presence of other parties that share a common 
legal interest, the analysis should be that there has been no waiver in the 
first place. For this reason, the type of communication covered by the 
common interest doctrine should be the same as that covered by the 
attorney-client privilege as a whole. 
Anticipating litigation may be one concrete external motive that 
signifies a client’s intent to seek legal advice that remains confidential, 
but it is hardly the only one. Clients—particularly corporate clients—
also seek legal advice to ensure that their future actions are lawful.
244
 By 
                                                     
242. Id. at 39. 
243. See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2009) (privilege not 
waived when plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails sent over a cloud-based e-
mail account on a company computer).  
244. See King, supra note 55, at 1425 n.84. 
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recognizing the common interest doctrine, jurisdictions have accepted 
that parties expect their legal communications with other parties that 
share a common legal interest to remain privileged. The waiver analysis 
should not differ depending on whether the parties with a common 
interest are seeking legal advice for a lawsuit or to ensure advance 
compliance with the law. 
By determining that the common interest doctrine need not coincide 
with the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-client privilege, the 
majority is also at odds with the spirit of Upjohn. Upjohn indicates that 
the scope of third-party waiver has to do with the client’s state of 
mind.
245
 The state of mind required is that of seeking legal advice, which 
occurs in a variety of contexts. Nowhere in formulations of attorney-
client privilege or third-party waiver does the common law require 
anticipation of litigation. The common interest doctrine acknowledges 
that clients’ states of mind while engaging in legal communications with 
parties that share a common interest are that these communications will 
remain private—and this is true whether or not the legal communications 
involve litigation, or something completely different. 
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is the same in both 
litigation and non-litigation contexts,
246
 and the common interest 
doctrine should not turn on that distinction. Either the common interest 
doctrine serves the purposes of the attorney-client privilege in both 
contexts, or in neither. In short, the litigation requirement does not serve 
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”247 
B. The Risk That the Common Interest Doctrine Will Over-Protect 
Communications Is Low Because It—Like the Attorney-Client 
Privilege Itself—Does Not Shield Non-Legal Communications or 
Underlying Facts 
The common interest doctrine does not sweep too broadly absent the 
litigation requirement. The Ambac majority asserted that applying the 
common interest doctrine to non-litigation-related legal communications 
“could result in the loss of evidence of a wide range of communications 
between parties who assert common legal interests but who really have 
                                                     
245. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
246. See id. at 389.  
247. Id.   
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only nonlegal or exclusively business interests to protect.”248 However, 
the common interest doctrine cannot and does not protect 
communications that would not have been privileged in the first place. 
“Where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal 
opinion whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of 
business advice, it is not privileged” by the attorney-client privilege.249 
The common interest doctrine is the same—the “common interest” must 
be legal in nature,
250
 attorneys must be present, and any disclosure to a 
client with a common interest absent still waives the privilege. 
Additionally, the communications must be for the purpose of securing 
legal advice, so business communications with only a tangential legal 
element are not protected.
251
 The common interest doctrine does not 
operate to shield the underlying facts of communications after those 
communications have been disclosed to a third party because the 
attorney-client privilege itself does not shield underlying facts.
252
 
Given these restraints on the common interest doctrine, Ambac’s 
concern that it might shield business communications is somewhat 
confounding. The majority asserted that applying the common interest 
doctrine to non-litigation-related legal communications “could result in 
the loss of evidence of a wide range of communications between parties 
who assert common legal interests but who really have only nonlegal or 
exclusively business interests to protect.”253 The Ambac majority did 
not—and indeed, could not—give examples or point to actual cases 
where the common interest doctrine was applied to “non-legal or 
exclusively business” communications254 because the common interest 




Absent the possibility of the common interest doctrine applying to 
non-legal communications, the Ambac majority’s concern with 
                                                     
248. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 38 (N.Y. 2016). This 
statement is somewhat confounding given that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to 
nonlegal communications in the first place.   
249. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359–60 (D. Mass. 1950). 
250. King, supra note 55, at 1412–13.  
251. Id.  
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
2000); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981). 
253. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38 (emphasis added). 
254. See generally Ambac, 57 N.E.3d. 
255. The attorney-client privilege only covers communications for the purpose of securing legal 
advice, not business advice. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 
(D. Mass. 1950). 
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overbroad application of the common interest doctrine is misguided. 
While there may be a higher likelihood that communications absent the 
threat of litigation are for a business (nonlegal) purpose,
256
 claims of 
privilege for those communications will not necessarily succeed. Courts 
can adequately assess each claim of privilege as they do in any other 
circumstance and reject those without merit. 
C. Ambac’s Litigation Requirement Creates Arbitrary Outcomes, 
Harms the Public Interest, and Encourages Gamesmanship 
A simple hypothetical exposes the practical consequences of Ambac’s 
formulation of the litigation requirement. Imagine that Entity One and 
Entity Two are corporations that have signed a merger agreement. 
Assume the entities share a common legal interest in ensuring that the 
merger complies with all applicable laws and regulations. The CEO of 
Entity One (CEO One) goes to a meeting with the CEO of Entity Two 
(CEO Two) and attorneys for both corporations. At the meeting, CEO 
One and CEO Two seek legal advice from their attorneys on how to 
ensure that the merger complies with applicable securities laws. The 
meeting goes well, and CEO One is optimistic about the merger. As he 
leaves the meeting, he checks his phone and discovers an e-mail from a 
lawyer containing a threat to sue on behalf of Entity One shareholders 
and alleging that the merger agreement violates securities laws. Under 
Ambac, in discovery, the communications in the meeting are not covered 
by the common interest doctrine—even though they were legal 
communications with counsel—because they do not relate to pending or 
anticipated litigation. The court orders Entity One to disclose the 
conversations during discovery. 
Now imagine the same set of facts, except this time, CEO One 
happens to check his phone right before walking into the meeting. He 
discovers the litigation threat that alleges securities violations. He then 
walks into the meeting and promptly tells CEO Two and Entity Two’s 
attorneys, “I just got word we are being sued already for securities 
violations. We really need to make sure we remain in compliance with 
securities laws as we go forward.” The rest of the meeting proceeds as it 
did in the first hypothetical. Under Ambac, the communications in this 
scenario are likely covered by the common interest doctrine because 
                                                     
256. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38 (citing James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the 
Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual 
Gain, 16 REV LITIG 631, 642 (1997)) (“[I]n a non-litigation setting the danger is greater that the 
underlying communication will be for a commercial purpose rather than for securing legal advice.”). 
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they relate to “pending or anticipated litigation.” The court upholds 
Entity One’s claim of attorney-client privilege for the conversations. 
This hypothetical underscores the consequences of Ambac’s formulation 
of the litigation requirement. Whether the attorney-client privilege 
protects Entity One and Two’s legal communications at the meeting 
depended solely on when CEO One happened to check his e-mail. 
The arbitrary nature of the litigation requirement is harmful to clients, 
but it is also harmful to the public. The public interest in observance of 
law can be substantial in many nonlitigation contexts. For example, 
corporations that have agreed to undergo a substantial merger share a 
common legal interest in the surviving entity complying with all laws 
and regulations—a legal purpose that serves the ends of the merging 
entities, shareholders, and society.
257
 To accomplish their shared legal 
interest in compliance with the law, it is necessary that merging entities 
and their separate counsel share and cooperate on legal strategy—the 
sheer number and complexity of shared legal obligations requires it.
258
 
Companies in this situation have a critical interest in retaining their 
attorney-client privilege during the pre-closing process. But Ambac’s 
holding ensures that the threat that all such communications may be 
subject to protracted discovery in a future lawsuit discourages these 
entities from disclosing the facts necessary for their attorneys to give 
sound legal advice and ensure compliance with the law. This result 
harms not just the parties but also the public as a whole, which has an 
interest in corporate entities following the law. 
Even in areas riddled with litigation, the doctrine does not apply 
under Ambac’s formulation unless there is a threat of specific 
litigation.
259
 In recent years, a significant percentage of mergers and 
acquisitions were the target of merger objection suits.
260
 Between 2011 
and 2014, over ninety percent of mergers valued over $100 million were 
subject to shareholder suits (although that number declined to sixty-four 
percent in the first half of 2016).
261
 Many of these cases settle, but some 
                                                     
257. See King, supra note 55, at 1433 n.132 (“Heavy government regulation of corporations 
increases the likelihood of government litigation against corporations, but also renders corporations 
more vulnerable to suit by private parties.”); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.  
258. King, supra note 55, at 1433 n.132. See also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.  
259. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38. 
260. Ravi Sinha, Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies: Review of 
2015 and 1H 2016 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1, http://www.cornerstone.com/ 
Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5T9A-DL5F]. 
261. Id.  
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cases result in extremely large judgments.
262
 But Ambac rejected Bank 
of America’s argument that the constant threat of litigation in mergers 
met the anticipated litigation requirement.
263
 The result is an incentive 
for entities that share a common legal interest in complying with the law 
to not fully communicate with each other’s attorneys, leading to less 
effective legal advice and unintentional noncompliance with the law. 
By requiring the threat of specific litigation, the litigation requirement 
encourages plaintiffs to withhold notification of planned litigation until 
the last possible moment, and possibly even to delay filing a lawsuit. 
Recall the hypothetical above about the meeting between CEO One, 
CEO Two, and their lawyers. Now imagine that the plaintiffs are aware 
of Ambac’s litigation requirement. Instead of emailing the Complaint to 
CEO One on the day of the meeting, the plaintiffs may decide to delay 
threatening litigation or filing their Complaint until the last possible 
moment. During that time, CEO One, CEO Two, and their attorneys 
hold several more meetings where they discuss compliance with 
securities laws. Under Ambac, all of those legal communications are 
waived. 
Control over waiver of the attorney-client privilege should be in the 
hands of the party seeking legal advice.
264
 By requiring an actual threat 
of litigation by a particular legal adversary to invoke the common 
interest doctrine, Ambac’s formulation of the litigation requirement 
strips that control from the client and places it with the client’s legal 
adversaries. Under Ambac, it is the adversary’s threat of litigation that 
triggers the common interest doctrine for legal communications 
postdating that threat.
265
 A legal adversary planning to sue in a 
jurisdiction where New York State rules of evidence apply need only 
wait as long as possible to bring the suit in order to gain full discovery of 
legal communications that would have been shielded under the common 
interest doctrine if the adversary threatened litigation earlier. In this way, 
the litigation requirement is contrary to the longstanding formulation of 
the privilege as the client’s to control, and it leads to arbitrary 
application of the privilege. 
                                                     
262. See, e.g., Am.’s Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d. 1213 (Del. 2012) (affirming judgment 
for shareholders of over $2 billion in damages and over $304 million in attorney’s fees); In re S. 
Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 6866900 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2011) 
(awarding $1.347 billion, plus interest and attorneys’ fees).   
263. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38. 
264. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney 
Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts Communicated, 48 
AM. U. L. REV. 967, 979 (1999) (citations omitted). 
265. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ambac provides an alluring sense of clarity for an otherwise muddled 
doctrine. However, that clarity comes with a cost: Ambac’s litigation 
requirement is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the common 
interest doctrine and results in arbitrary restrictions on the attorney-client 
privilege. This arbitrary application has real costs: it disincentivizes full 
disclosure that is the purpose of the privilege in the first place, and 
promotes gamesmanship by encouraging plaintiffs to notify defendants 
of litigation at the last possible moment. 
For these reasons, New York and jurisdictions that have adopted a 
litigation requirement should reconsider it. Moreover, jurisdictions that 
have not yet addressed the litigation requirement or the common interest 
doctrine itself should reject the litigation requirement from the outset.
266
 
Finally, and as other scholars have urged, courts, legislators, and 
scholars should continue to strive for a common terminology that clearly 
defines the common interest doctrine as defining the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege, not as an exception to its waiver. 
  
                                                     
266. See supra Part V. 
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 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Colorado
273
 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Connecticut
274









 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
                                                     
267. Given the variety of state positions on the common interest doctrine and the litigation 
requirement, a disclaimer is necessary. This table only counts states as having adopted the common 
interest doctrine or a litigation requirement if it is enshrined in a statute or recognized by the highest 
court in the state. Additionally, the common interest doctrine may evolve more quickly in some 
states after New York’s decision in Ambac v. Countrywide. See infra Part V. Therefore, this table is 
meant only as a guide and a useful starting point; scholars and practitioners should carefully 
research lower court opinions in the relevant states before relying on this table for a definitive 
statement of the doctrine.  
268. Alabama’s privilege statute closely follows the URE language but omits “pending action,” 
suggesting that the common interest doctrine might apply in a non-litigation context. ALA. R. EVID. 
502(b)(3). However, the Advisory Committee’s Notes cite a Seventh Circuit opinion that states that 
the section should be “broadly applied to cover any mutual interest that may promote the trial 
strategies of the parties,” which suggests the opposite. Note to ALA. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (quoting 
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)). The Alabama Supreme Court has not 
interpreted the provision. 
269. ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b)(3). 
270. ARIZ. R. EVID. 502 (The Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine with no litigation 
requirement. See Lund v. Donahoe, 261 P.3d 456, 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)). 
271. ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
272. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 2017) (A California Court of Appeals opinion refers to the 
common interest doctrine and the “joint client” exceptions as one and the same. See, e.g., Walters 
Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 593, 597 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). 
273. COLO. R. EVID. 502. 
274. CONN. CODE EVID. § 5-1. 
275. DEL. R. EVID. 502(b). 
276. Florida has not taken a position on the litigation requirement. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2017). 
277. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-501 (2017). 
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 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Indiana
281
 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Iowa
282
 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Kansas
283


















 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Minnesota
290






 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
                                                     
278. HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); see also Boston Auction Co., Ltd. v. Western Farm Credit Bank, 
925 F. Supp. 1478, 1483–84 (D. Haw. 1996). 
279. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(b)(3). Note 1 explains that the original provision was amended to 
expand the scope to cover “all communications,” not just those related to litigation. 
280. ILL. R. EVID. 502. 
281. IND. R.  EVID. 502. 
282. IOWA R. EVID. 5.502. 
283. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (2017). 
284. KY. R. EVID. 503(b)(3). 
285. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(B) (2017). 
286. ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
287. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (West 2017). 
288. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the litigation requirement. Hanover Ins. 
Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1110–12, (Mass. 2007); see also MASS. R. 
EVID. 502(b) (adopting the Restatement approach that rejects the litigation requirement). 
289. MICH. R. EVID. 501. 
290. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(b) (2017). 
291. MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3)(A)–(B) (requiring a “pending case” as opposed to a “pending 
action”); see also Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1244 (Miss. 2003). 
292. MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (2017). 
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 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
Rhode Island
306
 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
                                                     
293. Montana has not taken a position on the litigation requirement. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-
1-803 (2017); Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 280 P.3d 240, 244–
47 (Mt. 2012) (citing various state courts on the common interest doctrine but not adopting a 
specific rule on the litigation requirement). 
294. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503(2) (2017). 
295. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.095(3) (2017). 
296. N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
297. New Jersey courts have imposed a litigation requirement. See O’Boyle v. Borough of 
Longport, 94 A.3d 299 (N.J. 2014) (noting that the common interest doctrine “applies to 
communications between attorneys for different parties if the disclosure is made due to actual or 
anticipated litigation for the purpose of furthering a common interest”). 
298. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(B). 
299. New York courts have imposed a litigation requirement. See Ambac Assur. Corp. v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016); see also supra Part V. 
300. North Carolina has not addressed the issue by statute or in the North Carolina Supreme 
Court. 
301. N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
302. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 2017). 
303. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(3) (2017). 
304. OR. R. EVID. 503(2). 
305. PA. R. EVID. 501. 
306. Rhode Island has not yet addressed the issue by statute or in the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court. 
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 Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine 
 
 
                                                     
307. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the litigation requirement. Tobaccoville USA, 
Inc. v. McMaster, 692 S.E.2d 526, 531 (S.C. 2010) (“When the common interest doctrine applies, it 
operates as an exception to any potential waiver of privilege, regardless of the subject matter of the 
present litigation.”). 
308.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b)(3) (2017). 
309. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (2017). 
310. TEX. R. EVID. 502(b)(1)(C); see also In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 
2012) (“[O]ur privilege is not a ‘common interest’ privilege that extends beyond litigation.”). 
311. UTAH R. EVID. 504(b)(2). 
312. VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
313. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.7 (2017). 
314. Washington courts have applied the common interest doctrine for litigation-related 
communications, but have not addressed whether the common interest doctrine covers other legal 
communications. See State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845, 855 (1953). 
315. W. VA. R. EVID. 501. Additionally, a West Virginia opinion describes the “common interest 
doctrine” as applying to situations in which a lawyer represents multiple clients—contrary to the 
usual formulation involving separate attorneys. See State ex rel. Brison v. Kaufman, 584 S.E.2d 
480, 492 (W.V. 2003) (“Under the common interest doctrine, when an attorney acts for two 
different parties who each have a common interest, communications by either party to the attorney 
are not necessarily privileged in a subsequent controversy between the two parties.”) (citations 
omitted). 
316. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(2) (2017). 
317. WYO. R. EVID. 501. 
